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Social Security in an Era of
Retrenchment: What Would
Happen if the Social Security
Trust Funds Were Exhausted?
Kathryn L. Moore*
Social Security's income, including interest income on the Social
Security trust funds' reserves, currently exceeds costs1 The system,
however, is facing a long-term deficit. Specifically, the Social Security
Trustees project that, unless the Social Security Act is amended, by
2033 the system's reserves will be depleted," and its income will only
be sufficient to cover about 75 percent of scheduled benefits."
This article addresses two questions related to the funding of So-
cial Security. Part I discusses what would happen if the Social Security
trust funds were exhausted. Part II discusses whether Congress could
amend the Social Security Act to reduce retroactively scheduled but
unpaid Social Security benefits.
I. What WouldHappen if Social Security's Trust Funds
were Exhausted?
This section begins by describing the Social Security trust funds
and the sources of their appropriations. It then addresses the conflict
between the Social Security Act, which does not tie entitlement to So-
cial Security benefits to the availability of assets in the Social Security
trust funds, and the Antideficiency Act, which prohibits the Treasury
Department from issuing Social Security checks for benefits that ex-
ceed appropriated funds.
"Laramie L. Leatherman Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
The author would like to thank Michael Healy, Barry Kozak, and Paul Salamanca for
their helpful comments and Paul Secunda and Peter Wiedenbeck for the opportunity
to present this article at the conference on Employee Benefits in an Era of
Retrenchment.
1. BD. OF TRs., FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST FuNDs,
'THE 2012 ANNuAL REpORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FuNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 112-102, at 2
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 ANNuAL REPORT],available at http://www.ssa.gov/oactJtr/20121
tr2012.pdE
2. [d. at 3.
3. [d. at n.
44 28 ABA JOURNAL OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 43 (2012)
A. Trust Funds and the Sources of Their Appropriations
Section 201 of the Social Security Act creates two separate trust
funds: the "Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund"
(OASI trust fund)" and the "Federal Disability Insurance Trust
Fund" (DI trust fund)." Together, they are referred to as the OASDI
or Social Security trust funds." The term "trust fund," for purposes
of the federal budget, differs significantly from the term as used in
the private sector." For purposes ofthe federal budget, "trust fund re-
fers to a type of account, designated by law as a trust fund, for receipts
or offsetting receipts dedicated to specific purposes and the expendi-
ture of those receipts.V
The Social Security trust funds are financed principally through
permanent earmarks" Specifically, Social Security Act sections
201(a)(3)-.(4) and 20l(b)"° appropriate to the Social Security trust
funds an amount equal to 100 percent of the Federal Insurance and Con-
tributions Act"! (FICA) imposed on employees-f and employers.l" and an
amount equal to 100 percent of the taxes imposed on the self-employed
under chapter 2 ofthe Internal Revenue Code.!" In 2011, these appro-
priations accounted for 70 percent of the trust funds' total income.P
4. 42 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2006).
5. [d. § 401(b).
6. Cf PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, eTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, UNDERSTANDING
THESOCIALSECURITYTRUST FuNDs 1 (2010) ("Although legally distinct, they are often re-
ferred to collectively as 'the Social Security trust fund.'"), available at http://www.cbpp.
org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3299.
7. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. Gov.
ERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 136 (2012) [hereinafter OMB ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES],
available at http://www.whitehollse.gov/sites/defaultJ:file&'omh'budgetJfy2012/assetsispec.
pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GoVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2012 tbl.4 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultJfilesiombl
budgetlf'y20 12/assets/hist. pdf.
8. OMB ANALYTICALPERSPECTIVES,supra note 7, at 136.
9. WILLIAMC. FAY& MICHELLED. RODGERS,HARVARDLAW SCH. FED. BUDGETPOLICY
SEMINAR,BRIEFINGPAPERNo. 17, APPROPRIATIONSFORMANDATORYEXPENDITURES§ lIlA
(2008) ("The OASDI Trust Funds are financed almost entirely through permanent ap-
propriations from an earmarked revenue source."). Technically, Federal Insurance Con-
tributions Act (FICA) and self-employment taxes are paid directly to the General Fund
and then transferred from the General Fund to the Social Security trust funds pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 aud 402. [d. § II.iii.b u.14.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 401(a)(3)-(4), (b) (2006).
11. 26 U.S.C. ch. 21.
12. 26 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006).
13. [d. § 3111.
14. [d. § 1401.
15. 2012 ANNUALREPORT,supra note 1, at 6. Prior to the enactment of the tempo-
rary payroll tax holiday-s-Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and
Job Creation Act of2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 601, 124 Stat. 3296, 3309-appropriations
for FICA and self-employment taxes represented a much larger percentage of Social Se-
curity's total revenue. For example, in 2010, FICA and self-employment taxes accounted
for 82 percent of the trust funds' total income. See BD. OFTRs., FED. OLD-AGE& SURVNORS
INs. & FED.DISABILITYINs. TRUSTFuNDs, THE2011 ANNUALREPORTOFTHEBOARDOFTRUSTEES
OFTHEFEDERALOLD-AGEANDSURVNORSINSURANCEANDFEDERALDISABILITYINSURANCETRUST
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Section 201(d) ofthe Social Security Act requires that the assets of
the Social Security trust funds be invested in U.S. government
bonds.l" Section 201(0 of the Social Security Act requires that the in-
terest on, and proceeds from the sale or redemption of, any obligations
held by the trust funds be credited to and form a part of the trust
funds.!? In 2011, interest on the trust funds' investments accounted
for 14 percent of the trust funds' total income. IS
Section 86 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes an income tax
on certain Social Security benefits.P In essence, single taxpayers
with "combined income'P? that exceeds $25,000 and married taxpayers
with combined income that exceed $32,000 must pay income tax on
50 percent of their Social Security benefits.F' The revenue from this
tax, which is appropriated to the OASDI trust funds,"2 accounted for
3 percent of the trust funds' total income in 2011,23
Prior to 2011, less than 1 percent of the Social Security trust funds'
total income came from reimbursements from the General Fund.P" In
2011, reimbursements from the General Fund increased to 13 percent
of the Social Security trust funds' total income'" as a result of the reduc-
tion in self-employed and employee FICA taxes under the temporary
"payroll tax holiday" enacted for 2011,"6 and extended through 201227
FuNDs, H.R. Doc. No. 112-23, at 5 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 ANNuAL REPORT],available at
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2011ltr2011.pdf.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 40Hd) (2006).
17. [d. § 401(0.
18. 2012 ANNuAL REPORT,supra note 1, at 6.
19. 26 U.S.C. § 86 (2006).
20. For these purposes, "combined income" means the taxpayer's adjusted gross in-
come plus half of the taxpayer's Social Security benefits plus any tax-exempt interest in-
come. See ALICIA H. MUNNEL & DAN MULDOON, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE,
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION ON SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 6 D.9 (2008), available at httpJ/crr.
bc.edufbriefs/the-impact-of-inflation-on-social-security-benefits/.
21. In 1993, Congress amended IRC § 86 to impose tax on 85 percent of Social Se-
curity benefits for single taxpayers with combined income that exceeds $34,000 and for
married taxpayers with combined income that exceeds $44,000. The revenue generated
from the new tax is appropriated to the Hospital Insurance (Medicare) trust fund. See
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
22. Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 121(e), 97 Stat.
83 (appropriating to the OASI and DI trust funds revenues generated from IRC § 86 as
originally enacted at a rate of 50 percent).
23. See 2012 ANNuALREPORT,supra note 1, at 6.
24. See, e.g., 2011 ANNuALREPORT,supra note 15, at 5-6. In 2011, the primary Gen-
eral Fund reimbursement was for a temporary reduction in the employer FICA tax for
hiring certain unemployed workers under the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment
Act, Pub. L. No.111-147, § 101, 124 Stat. 71, 72 (2011). Id. at 22; see Soc. SEC.ADMIN.,
FISCALYEAR2012 BUDGETJUSTIFICATION(2011) (detailed discussion of all of the appropri-
ations made in 2010 and estimated in 2011 and 2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/
budgeti2012PTF.pdf.
25. 2012 ANNUALREPORT,supra note 1, at 6.
26. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 601, 124 Stat. 3309, 3296.
27. See Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-78,
§ 101, 125 Stat. 1280, 1281 (extending payroll tax holiday through Feb. 29, 2012); Middle
•
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B. Conflict Between the Social Security Act
and the Antideficiency Act
Section 201(h) of the Social Security Act28 requires that Social Se-
curity benefits be paid from the Social Security trust funds.P' Yet the
Social Security Act does not link beneficiaries' entitlement to the avail-
ability of assets in the trust funds. Rather, sections 20230and 22331of
the Social Security Act simply provide that individuals who satisfy the
Social Security Act's eligibility requirements are "entitled" to Social
Security benefits. Thus, Social Security is an "entitlement program'v''
pursuant to which the federal government is legally obligated to pay
benefits to beneficiaries who satisfy the statutory requirements re-
gardless of the availability of funds. 33
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, however, provides that "[n]o
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Ap-
propriations made by Law."34 The Appropriations Clause is imple-
mented by the Antideficiency Act,35which prohibits any officer or em-
ployee of the federal government from making or authorizing any
expenditure or obligation that exceeds the amount available through
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, § 1001, 126 Stat. 156,
158 (extending payroll tax holiday through calendar year 2012); see also Soc. SEC.ADMIN.,
supra note 24, at 13 (estimating appropriations of $79.368 billion in 2011 and $30.555
billion for payroll tax holiday through Feb. 29, 2012).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 401(h) (2008).
29. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 40l(h) requires that Social Security disability benefits
be paid from the Social Security DI trust fund and all other Social Security benefits be
paid from the DASI trust fund. As noted above, however, this article will refer to the two
trust funds together.
30. 42 US.C. § 402 (2006) (old age provisions).
31. Id. § 423 (disability provisions).
32. See KATIU.EENS. SWENDIMAN& THOMASJ. NICOLA,CONGoRESEARCHSERV.,RL
32822, SOCIALSECURITYREFORM:LEGALANALYSISOFSOCIALSECURITYBENEFITENTITLEMENT
ISSUES9 (2010) (citing sections 202 and 223 of the Social Security Act in support of the
statement that "Social Security is a statutory entitlement program. "): see also OMB AN·
ALYTICALPERSPECTIVES,supra note 7, at 134 ("Entitlement refers to a program in which the
Federal Government is legally obligated to make payments or provide aid to any person
who, or State or local government that, meets the legal criteria for eligibility. Examples
include Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Food Stamps.").
33. See 2 US.C. § 622(9) (2006) (defining "entitlement authority" as "the authority
to make payments (including loans and grants), the budget authority for which is not
provided for in advance by appropriations Acts, to any person or government if, under
the provisions of the law containing that authority, the United States is obligated to
make such payments to persons or governments who meet the requirements established
by that law.").
34. U.S. CONST.art. I, § 9, d. 7.
35. 31 US.C. § 134l(a)(1)(A); see Paul E. Salamanca, The Constitutionality of an
Executive Spending Plan, 92 Ky. L. J. 149, 181-85 (2003) (the Appropriations Clause is
substantially implemented by the Antideficiency Act); see also US. Gov'r ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,GAO-06-382SP, PRINCIPLESOF FEDERALAPPROPRIATIONSLAW6-34 to 6-36 (2006)
(summary of the history of the Antideficiency Act), available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/210/202819. pdf.
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an appropriation or fund.P" Violations of the Antideficiency Act are
punishable by administrative and criminal penalties, including sus-
pension from duty without payor removal from office.i'?fines of up
to $5,000, and/or imprisonment for up to two years.P''
Thus, under the Antideficiency Act, the Social Security trust
funds' balance determines whether the Treasury Department has
the legal authority to issue Social Security checks.P? yet the Social Se-
curity Act provides that individuals who satisfy the Act's eligibility re-
quirements are legally entitled to benefits regardless ofwhether there
are sufficient assets in the trust funds to pay for those benefits.t? The
Social Security Act does not address the question ofwhat would hap-
pen if the Social Security trust funds were exhausted."!
C. Reports Suggest Exhaustion of Funds Would Mean
Reduced Benefits
Past experience does not provide definitive guidance on what
would happen if the Social Security trust funds were exhausted be-
cause neither the OASI42trust fund nor the DI43trust fund has ever
36. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A). According to the GAO:
In simple terms, once an appropriation is exhausted, the making of any fur-
ther payments, apart from using expired balances to liquidate or make ad-
justments to valid obligations recorded against that appropriation violates
31 U.S.C. § 1341. When the appropriation is fully expended, no further pay-
ments may be made in any case. If an agency finds itself in this position, un-
less it has transfer authority or other clear statutory basis for making further
payments, it has little choice but to seek a deficiency or supplemental ap-
propriation from Congress, and to adjust or curtail operations as may be
necessary.
US. Oovr ACCOUNTABILITYOFFICE,supra note 35, at 6~41 to 6-42.
37. 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006).
38. Id. § 1350.
39. US. GEN.ACCOUNTINGOFFICE,GAO-01-199SP, FEDERALTRUSTANDOTHEREAR-
MARKEDFuNDs; ANSWERSTOFREQUENTLYAsKEDQUESTIONS15 (2001) (citing Antideficiency
Act in support of statement that "the fund balance determines whether Treasury has
the legal authority to issue checks for a program."), available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/210/200562.pdf.
40. According to the GAO, even under an entitlement program, an agency could
presumably meet a funding shortfall by such measures as making prorated payments,
but such actions would be only temporary pending receipt of sufficient funds to honor
the underlying obligation. The recipient would remain legally entitled to the balance.
See US. GEN.ACCOUNTINGOFFICE,GAO-04·261SP, PRINCIPLESOFAPPROPRIATIONSLAw3-49
n.40 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/202437.pdf.
41. CHRISTINESCOTT,CONGoRESEARCHSERV.,RL33514, SOCIALSECURITY:WHATwotnn
HAPPENIF THETRUSTFuNDs RANOUT?6 (2011), available at http;//aging.senate.gov/crsl
ss1.pdf ("The Social Security Act does not stipulate what would happen to benefits if
the trust funds ran out.").
42. The OASI trust fund was established in 1939. Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 201, 53
Stat. 1360, 1362 (1939).
43. The DI trust fund was created in 1956 with the passage of Pub. L. No. 84-880,
70 Stat. 807 (1956), and became effective in 1957.
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been exhausted.v' The trust funds have, however, approached exhaus-
tion in the past.'5 Most significantly, the Social Security Trustees pro-
jected in their 1982 Report that the OASI trust fund would be ex-
hausted by July 1983 if the Social Security Act was not amended.t"
Congress addressed this issue in the short term by permitting the
OASI trust fund to borrow from the Disability Income (DD and Hospi-
tal Insurance (Medicare) trust funds.f? It addressed the problem in the
long term by enacting the Social Security Amendments of 1983,48
which, among other things, accelerated scheduled increases in the
Social Security tax rates and introduced a delayed, gradual increase
in the age at which beneficiaries are entitled to full Social Security
bonefits.s?
The National Commission on Social Security Reform, which was
established in 1981 to review the financial condition of the Social
Security trust funds and offer recommendations on how their financial
condition might be improved, 50issued a report recommending, among
other things, that the Social Security Act provide for a fail-safe mech-
anism "so that benefits could continue to be paid on time despite unex-
pectedly adverse conditions which occur with little advance notice."51
The Commission considered three different mechanisms: (1) borrowing
from the General Fund of the Treasury for a limited period of time;
(2) temporarily reducing payable benefits; and (3) temporarily increas-
ing the Social Security tax rates and/or the maximum taxable earnings
base. The members of the Commission, however, strongly disagreed as
to the type of mechanism, or combination of mechanisms, that should
44. See SCOTI,supra note 41, at 3 ("Neither of the Social Security trust funds has
ever become insolvent."),
45. Stephen C. Goss, The Future Financial Status of the Social Security Program,
70 Soc. SEC. BULL. 111, 113 (2010) ("For years 1973 through 1983, the combined DASI
and DI Trust Funds were operating with a negative cash flow that was depleting the
trust fund reserves toward exhaustion."); see also SCOTT,supra note 41, at 4 ("[I]n the
early 19808, a solvency crisis loomed for the GASI trust fund."),
46. Bn. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST FuNDs,
THE 1982 ANNuAL REPORT OFTHE BOARD OFTRUSTEESOFTHEFEDERALOLD-AGEAND SURVIVORS
INSURANCEAND FEDERALDISABILITY INSURANCETRUST FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 97-163, at 3
(1982), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/trust/1982/1982.pdf.
47. Act of Dec. 29,1981, Pub. L. No. 97-123, § 1, 95 Stat. 1659, 1659. In November
and December of 1982, the DASI trust fund borrowed about $5.1 billion from the DI trust
fund and $12.4 billion from the Hospital Insurance (Medicare) trust fund. The OASI
trust fund repaid the $17.5 billion it borrowed by 1996. See SCOTI, supra note 41, at 4
n.17.
48. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65.
49. See John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legis-
lative History and Summary of Provisions, SOC. SEC. BULL., July 1983, at 3-4 (overview of
the changes wrought by the 1983 Amendments).
50. Exec. Order No.12,335, 3 C.F.R. § 217 (1981), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 401
(2006).
51. Report of the National Commission on Social Security Reform, Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Feb. 1983, at 10.
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be used 52 Thus, the Commission did not recommend a particular fail-
safe mechanism, and Congress did not enact one53
Because Social Security does not contain a fail-safe mechanism, it
is not entirely clear what would happen if the Social Security trust
funds were exhausted.P" Nevertheless, there appears to be general
agreement that Social Security benefits would most likely be reduced,
by either timely payment of reduced benefits or delayed payment of
full benefits. 55 It appears highly unlikely that full Social Security ben-
efits would continue to be paid in a timely manner, in violation of the
Antideficiency Act56
In their 2012 Report, the Social Security Trustees projected that
the Social Security trust funds would reach exhaustion in 2033, and
at that point in time, Social Security's noninterest income would be
sufficient to support payment of 75 percent of Social Security bene-
fits."? It further projected that beginning in 2086, Social Security's
noninterest income would be sufficient to support 73 percent of sched-
uled benefits58 The Trustees referred to the benefits that Social Secur-
ity's noninterest income could support as "payable" benefits, while it
referred to total benefits to which beneficiaries would be entitled
under the Social Security Act as "scheduled but not fully payable" ben-
efits59 Apparently relying on the Social Security Trustees' character-
ization of funded benefits as "payable" benefits, Stephen Goss, chief ac-
tuary of the Social Security Administration, declared that "[ilf trust
52. See id.
53. Congress did, however, enact a provision requiring that the Board of Trust-
ees submit to Congress a report making recommendations to remedy inadequate bal-
ances in the trust funds if the Board determines at any time that the balance ratio of
any trust fund may become less than 20 percent for any calendar year. The report
must state the extent to which benefits would have to be reduced or the extent to
which FICA and self-employment taxes would have to be increased, or set a combina-
tion of the two, to ensure a balance ratio of no less than 20 percent. See 42 U.S.C. § 910
(2006).
54. See Sccrr; supra note 41, at 6 ("'Because the Antideficiency Act would effec-
tively prohibit the government from paying full benefits on time and the Social Security
Act entitles beneficiaries and qualifying applicants to scheduled benefits, the conflict be-
tween these two laws would need to be resolved by Congress or by the courts."); CONGo
BUDGETOFFICE,SOCIALSECURITY:A PRIMER43 n.15 (200n, available at https:llwww.cbo.
govIsitesldefa ul tJfileslcbofiles/ftpdocs/32xx1doc32131 en tirereport. pdf C'Because the Social
Security Act states that benefits are only payable from the trust funds, it is not clear how
revenues would be distributed to beneficiaries after those funds were depleted.").
55. See SCOTI,supra note 41, at 6 ("[E]ither full benefit checks would be paid on a
delayed schedule or reduced benefits would be paid on time, according to trust fund ex-
perts in multiple federal agencies.").
56. Cf. FAY & RoDGERS,supra note 9, at § II.iii (violations of the Antideficiency Act
are relatively rare and generally quite minor and "overall the Act is effective at ensuring
expenditures are made appropriately").
57. 2012 ANNuAL REPORT,supra note 1, at U.
58. [d.
59. [d. at 11 fig.ILD2.
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fund assets are exhausted without reform, benefits will necessarily be
lowered with no effect on budget deficits."6oGoss went on to state that
"[ilf the trust funds ever become exhausted, expenditures thereafter
would be limited to the amount of continuing tax income."61
In 2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)62wrote a re-
port applying its criteria for evaluating Social Security reform pro-
posals'" to a "Trust Fund Exhaustion" scenario.P" In the report, the
GAO assumed that once the trust funds were exhausted, benefit
checks would be reduced in proportion to the annual shortfall, in effect
providing for an across-the-board reduction in all benefits."5 The GAO
noted, however, that this approach was intended as an analytical tool,
not a legal dotermination.s" The GAO declared,
The nature and scope of SSA's administrative challenges under the
Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario are difficult to describe or assess
given a lack of historical precedent and legislative clarity on how
SSA would proceed. At a minimum, a focus on cash management
would be needed for SSA to calculate and implement the ongoing
benefit adjustments required under the scenario.f?
In Social Security: What Would Happen if the Trust Funds Ran
Out, Christine Scott ofthe Congressional Research Service questioned
whether the Social Security officials would have the authority to re-
duce benefits to which beneficiaries are entitled under the Social Se-
curity Act."8Accordingly, she suggested that the most likely scenario
in the event of trust fund exhaustion is that benefit payments would
be delayed rather than explicitly reduced.
Ms. Scott noted that under the Social Security Administration's
current benefit payment schedule, most beneficiaries' payment dates
60. Goss, supra note 45, at 111 (this statement was made in the introduction to the
article and does not refer to the trustees' report).
61. Id. at 121. This statement was made after noting that the trustees' report care-
fully distinguishes between "scheduled" and "payable" benefits. [d. Mr. Goss also men-
tions the trustees' projection regarding "payable" benefits. [d. at 113.
62. The General Accounting Office is now called the Government Accountability
Office.
63. See GEN. ACCOUNTINGOFFICE,GAOIT-HEHS-99-94, SOCIALSECURITY:CRITERIAFOR
EVALUATINGSOCIALSECURITYREFORMPROPOSALS(1999).
64. GEN. ACCOUNTINGOFFICE, GAO-03-907, SOCIALSECURITYREFORM:ANALYSISOF A
TRUSTFuxn EXHAUSTIONSCENARIO1 (2003).
65. [d.
66. [d. at 14 n.S ("This definition of a Trust Fund Exhaustion scenario represents
an analytic convenience and not a legal determination as to how benefits would fare in
the event the combined OASDI Trust Funds were exhausted.").
67. [d. at 6-7.
68. SCOTY,supra note 41, at 5 n.22. See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTINGOFFICE, supra
note 40, at 3-49 (''Where legislation creates, or authorizes the administrative creation
of, binding legal obligations without regard to the availability of appropriations, a fund-
ing shortfall may delay actual payment but does not authorize the administering agency
to alter or reduce the 'entitlement.''').
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are based on their day of birth,"? Thus, benefits are paid on (1) the sec-
ond Wednesday of the month for beneficiaries born between the first
and the tenth of the month, (2) the third Wednesday of the month
for beneficiaries born between the eleventh and the twentieth of the
month, and (3) the fourth Wednesday of the month for beneficiaries
born between the twenty-first and the thirty-first of the month.??
She contended that so long as the trust funds are adequate, benefit
payments could be made in a timely manner following this schedule."!
If the trust funds' balance reaches zero, benefit payments could stop
until additional money is appropriated to the trust funds.F Once addi-
tional money is appropriated, benefit payments could resume where
they stopped until money again runs out.?" This cycle could continue
indefinitely.?" Scott stated that after trust fund exhaustion, all benefi-
ciaries would receive checks paying benefits in full about nine months
of the year, but the timing of the checks would be unpredictabls.?"
Thus, it appears that if the Social Security trust funds were ex-
hausted, Social Security beneficiaries would receive reduced benefits.
They would, however, remain legally entitled to receive full scheduled
benefits if and when Congress appropriated a sufficient amount of
money to the Social Security trust funds. Suppose, however, Congress
elected not to appropriate additional funds. Could Congress amend the
Social Security Act to reduce benefits retroactively so that beneficia-
ries never receive the unfunded portion of their scheduled benefits?
II. Could Congress Amend Social Security to Reduce
Retroactively Scheduled but Unpaid Benefits?
The law points in two different directions with respect to the ques-
tion of whether Congress could amend Social Security to reduce retro-
actively scheduled but unpaid benefits. On the one hand, as discussed
above, the Social Security Act states that individuals who satisfy the
statutory requirements are "entitled" to benefits, and since their incep-
tion, Social Security benefits have been characterized as an "earned
right."?" On the other hand, Congress has always expressly reserved
69. SCOTI',supra note 41, at 6; see also Day of the Month Benefits Are Paid, U.S. Soc.
SEC.ADMIN.,http://ssa-cllsthelp.ssa.gov/app/answersJdetaiVa_id/8 (last updated Jan. 24,
2012).
70. SCOIT,supra note 41, at 6. Benefits are paid on the third day of the month for
most beneficiaries who began to receive benefits before 1997. [d.
71. [d.
72. [d.
73. [d.
74. [d.
75. [d.
76. In recommending that Social Security be financed principally through payroll
taxes, the Committee on Economic Security, the group charged with drafting the original
Social Security program, explained that "[c]ontributory annuities are unquestionably
preferable to noncontributory pensions. They come to the workers as a right, whereas
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"[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision" of the Social
Security Act77
In Flemming v. Nestor,78 the Supreme Court addressed the ques-
tion ofwhether Social Security's nature as an "earned right" makes it a
vested property right subject to protection under the Fifth Amend-
ment. In that case, Ephram Nestor,"? who immigrated to the United
States from Bulgaria in 1913, challenged the termination of his Social
Security benefits under section 202(n) ofthe Social Security Act. This
section provided for the termination of Social Security benefits for
beneficiaries who are deported under, among other sections, section
241(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality ActSO After having
paid FICA taxes from December 1936 through January 1955,SlNestor
became eligible for Social Security old-age benefits in November
1955s2 In 1956, he was deported from the United States under section
24l(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for having been
a member of the Communist Party from 1933 to 1939.83 Shortly after
his deportation, his benefits were terminated under section 202(n) of
the Social Security Act.84
In 1958, a complaint was filed on Nestor's behalf challenging the
constitutionality of the termination of his Social Security benefits.f"
The district court held that Nestor's Social Security benefits were
"property rights" and that Nestor "was not afforded due process of
law in being deprived of his benefits through a legislative enactment
which took such benefits because of deportation.Y" In a five-to-four
the noncontributory pensions [that is, welfare] must be conditioned upon a 'means' test."
Soc. SEC. 1934-35 COMM. ON ECON. SEC., REPORTOF THE COMMI'ITEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY
22 (1935), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reportslces5.html. According to Robert
Ball, Social Security commissioner under three different administrations, Social Secur-
ity benefits' character as an earned right is the second principle of Social Security's nine
guiding principles. See ROBERT M. BALL, INSURING THE ESSEN'TIALS: BOB BALL ON SOCIAL SE-
CURITY:A SELECTIONOFARTICLES AND ESSAYS FROM1942 THROUGH2000, at 6 (Thomas N.
Bethel ed., 2000); see also JOHNATTARlAN, THELUDWIGVONMISESINST.,THE ROOTSOF
THE SOCIALSECURITYMYTH5-6 (2001) (early characterizations of Social Security as an
earned or "contractual" right), available at http://mises.org/pdflasc/essays/attarian.pdf.
77. 42 US.C § 1304 (2006).
78. 363 US. 603 (1960).
79. See Karen M. Tani, Flemming v. Nestor: Anticommunism, the Welfare State,
and the Making of "New Property," 26 LAw & HIST.REV.379 (2008) (detailed analysis of
Ephram Nestor and his case).
80. See 42 US.C. § 402(n) (2006).
81. Nestor, 363 US. at 621.
82. ld. at 605.
83. ld.
84. ld.; see 42 US.C. § 402(n) (2006).
85. Tani, supra note 79, at 392. The revocation was challenged on four grounds:
0) as a penalty inflicted without a judicial trial; (2) as an ex post facto punishment; (3) as
irrational and thus in violation of the Due Process clause; and (4) as a violation of the
First Amendment by punishing Nestor for his past membership in the Communist party. [d.
86. Nestor v. Folsom, 169 F. Supp. 922, 934 (D.D.C. 1959), reo'd: sub nom. Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 US. 603 (1960).
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decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that
the district court erred in holding that section 202(n) of the Social Se-
curity Act deprived Nestor of an "accrued property right."87 Relying in
large part on section 1104 ofthe Social Security Act, which reserves to
Congress "[tjhe right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision" of the
Act, the Court declared that "[t]o engraft upon the Social Security sys-
tem a concept of 'accrued property rights' would deprive it of the flex-
ibility and boldness in adjustment to ever changing conditions it de-
mands."88 The Court held that "a person covered by the Act has not
such a right in benefit payments as would make every defeasance of
'accrued' interests violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amsndment.t"?
The Court went on to note that Congress may not amend the So-
cial Security Act entirely free of constitutional restraint.P? Rather, the
Due Process Clause bars legislation that "manifests a patently arbi-
trary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.Y! Never-
theless, the Court found two rational justifications for section 202(n)92
and held that it could not be "condemned as so lacking in rational jus-
tification as to offend due process.Y'
In The New Property/'" Charles Reich harshly criticized Flemming
v. Nestor9S and argued that government largess should be a protected
property right."6 He offered four guiding principles to consider as
the country moves toward a welfare state where largess must "begin
to do the work of propertyr"? Under the first principle, the govern-
ment should not have the power to "buy up" rights guaranteed by
the Constitution; like the rule prohibiting unconstitutional condi-
tions, the government "should not be able to impose any condition on
largess that would be invalid if imposed on something other than a
87. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 608.
88. Id. at 610-11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006)).
89. Id. at 611.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The Court found that it was not irrational for Congress to consider a benefi-
ciary's residence in determining eligibility for Social Security benefits because nonresi-
dent Social Security beneficiaries are unlikely to use their benefits to contribute to the
United States' national economy. In addition, the Court found that it could not be
"deemed irrational for Congress to have concluded that the public purse should not
be utilized to contribute to the support of those deported on the grounds specified in
the statute." [d. at 612.
93. Id.
94. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALEL. J. 733 (1964).
95. [d. at 768-71, 775.
96. [d. at 785-86 (''The concept of right is most urgently needed with respect to
benefits like unemployment compensation, public assistance, and old age insurance ...
Only by making such benefits into rights can the welfare state achieve its goal of providing
a secure minimum basis for individual well-being and dignity in a society where each man
cannot be wholly the master of his own destiny.").
97. Id. at 778.
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'gratuity.'''9s Under the second principle, substantive limits, including
limits on relevance and discretion, should be imposed on governmental
power over largess. In addition, policy-making authority should not be
delegated to organizations that are essentially private.P'' Under the
third principle, government largess should be protected by procedural
safeguards. rooUnder the fourth and final principle:
Eventually those forms of largess which are closely linked to status
must be deemed to be held as of right .... If revocation is necessary,
not by reason of the fault of the individual holder, hut by reason of
overriding demands of public policy, perhaps payment of just corn-
pensation would be appropriate.I''!
Professor Reich's article was arguably the most influential law review
article of the second half of the twentieth century, with at least fifty
cases relying on it by the article's twenty-fifth anniversary.V'? Among
those fifty cases are Goldberg v. Kelly'03 and Mathews v. Eldridgel''"
In Golberg, the Supreme Court explicitly cited Professor Reich's work
and declared, "[ijt may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements
as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.''''05 In Mathews, the Supreme
Court held that the continued receipt of Social Security disability bene-
fits is a "statutorily created 'property' interest protected by the Fifth
Amendment.v'P"
Citing these cases, commentators have argued that Flemming v.
Nestor is "outdated case law'"?" that has been "called into question. "10S
Indeed, relying in part on Goldberg v. Kelly, Matthew Hawes has ar-
gued that Social Security benefits are a property interest protected
not only by procedural due process, but also by the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.'?"
In Goldberg and Mathews, among other cases, the Supreme Court
embraced Professor Reich's third principle that government largess
should be protected by procedural safeguards. In no case, however,
has the Court adopted Professor Reich's fourth and final principle
that government largess should be protected by the Takings Clause
98. [d. at 779-82.
99. [d. at 782-83.
100. [d. at 783-785.
101. [d. at 785.
102. Charles A. Reich, The New Property After 25 Years, 24 U.S.F. L. REV.223,
242-53 (1990).
103. 397 US. 254 (1970).
104. 424 US. 319 (1976).
105. 397 US. at 263 n.S.
106. 424 US. at 332.
107. Matthew H. Hawes, So No Damn Politician Can Ever Scrap It: The Conetitu-
tionai Protection of Social Security Benefits, 65 U. PITT.L. REV.898, 907 (2004).
108. Tani, supra note 79, at 381 n.8.
109. Hawes, supra note 107, at 907-10.
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as a vested property right. Rather, in Richardson v. Belcher,l1o the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed Flemming v. Nestor and limited Goldberg and
its progeny to ensuring the procedural due process rights of recipients
of government largess.
In Belcher, the recipient of Social Security disability benefits, who
was also receiving workers' compensation benefits, challenged a
monthly offset of his Social Security benefits under section 224 of
the Social Security Act. In rejecting the recipient's challenge, the
Court reaffirmed its holding in Flemming v. Nestor that "a person cov-
ered by the [Social Security] Act has not such a right in benefit pay-
ments as would make every defeasance of 'accrued' interests violative
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. "111According to
the Court, "the analogy drawn in Goldberg between social welfare
and 'property' cannot be stretched to impose a constitutional limitation
on the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the law of
entitlement to public benefits."112Instead, the Court reaffirmed the
Nestor rule that the Fifth Amendment only protects Social Security
beneficiaries against arbitrary classifications and found that Con-
gress's goals in adopting the offset provision were legitimate and its
classification was rationally related to achieving those goals.
One may sincerely believe, and perhaps even persuasively argue,
that Flemming v. Nestor was wrongly decided and that Social Security
benefits should be treated as a vested property right protected under
the Takings Clause1l3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly reaffirmed Ftemming-r: and limited Goldberg to ensuring that
government largess is protected by procedural due process.P" Thus,
it appears clear that Congress may retroactively reduce Social Secur-
ity benefits without violating the Takings Clause.l!"
110. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
111. [d. at 80 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960».
112. [d. at 81.
113. See Hawes, supra note 107; Reich, supra note 102; see also Mark Pettit Jr.
Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.D. L. REV.551, 571 0.98 (1983). But see Patricia E.
Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security Priva-
tization, 41 B.C. L. REv.975, 1044-53 (2000) (Social Security should be conceptualized as
an earnings-based entitlement rather than a private property interest).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Fior D'Italia, 536 U.S. 238, 254 0.2 (2002) (J. Souter,
dissenting); Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52
(1986); United States RR Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980).
115. See also Thomas W.Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA.
L. REV. 885, 958 (2000) ("The proposition that Goldberg-type 'property' exists only for
procedural due process has been perceived as so self-evidently correct that it has
never been revisited.").
116. Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Im-
pact on Economic Legislation, 76 HU, L. REV. 605, 653 (1996) C'The Court has uniformly
found that the 'new' properly, meaning government entitlements such as welfare, social
security, and public education, are not considered property for the purposes of the Tak-
ings Clause.").
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Under Flemming and Belcher, however, Congress is not free to
reduce Social Security benefits retroactively without limit. Rather,
substantive due process prohibits Congress from arbitrarily reducing
Social Security benefits.U? A retroactive across-the-board reduction
in scheduled but unfunded Social Security benefits, however, is un-
likely to run afoul of such a prohibition. 118Addressing a funding deficit
is certainly a legitimate state purpose, and retroactively reducing ben-
efits across-the-board clearly is rationally related to that purpose.
Thus, it appears that Congress could retroactively reduce scheduled
but unfunded Social Security benefits.
III. Conclusion
Unless the Social Security Act is amended, the Social Security
Trustees project that by 2033, assets in the Social Security trust
funds will only be sufficient to pay 75 percent of scheduled benefits.
At that point, the Antideficiency Act would prevent the Treasury De-
partment from issuing checks to pay full benefits, and beneficiaries
would, in all likelihood, receive reduced benefits. Beneficiaries, how-
ever, would remain legally entitled to their higher scheduled benefits.
If, and when, Congress were to appropriate sufficient funds to the So-
cial Security trust funds to cover scheduled but unpaid benefits, bene-
ficiaries would be entitled to the payment of full benefits.
Congress, however, would not be legally required to appropriate
sufficient funds to ensure full payment of scheduled benefits. Although
individuals who satisfy Social Security's statutory requirements are
legally entitled to Social Security benefits, Social Security benefits
are not vested property interests protected by the Takings Clause.
Congress has the power to alter, amend, or appeal any provision of
the Social Security Act and may retroactively reduce benefits so long
as any such reduction is not wholly irrational and arbitrary. If Con-
gress were to enact an across-the-board retroactive reduction in Social
Security benefits to address Social Security's deficit, such a reduction
would likely be held to be rationally related to the legitimate state pur-
pose of addressing the program's funding deficit.
Of course, the Social Security trust funds need never reach the
point of exhaustion. Congress can, and should, amend the Social
117. Cf SWENDIMAN & NICOLA, supra note 32, at 4 ("Thus, only if Congress were to
act in a totally irrational and arbitrary manner would due process considerations inva-
lidate a subsequent amendment.").
118. See PBGC v. RA. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984) ("[T]he strong defer-
ence accorded legislation in the field of national economic policy is no less applicable
when that legislation is applied retroactively. Provided that the retroactive application
of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational
means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive
province of the legislative and executive branches.").
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Security Act to address the program's long-term deficit.P? Congress
could solve the long-term deficit by increasing tax revenues, reducing
benefits, or a combination of the two. None of those changes, however,
is costless.P?
The fact that reform is not easy does not relieve Congress of the
responsibility to act. Congress can, and should, reform Social Security.
And the sooner, the better.F!
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